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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of housing discrimination against families with
children is a growing phenomenon which presents complex legal
issues with serious sociological ramifications. Several jurisdictions
* Member, District of Columbia and North Carolina Bars; B.A. cum laude,
University of North Carolina, 1979; J.D., North Carolina Central University, 1983.

1. Note, FamilialDiscriminationIn Rental Housing: The Halet Decision, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 1085 (1984); Stanley, Age Restriction In Housing: The Denial of
The Family's Right To Its Integrity, 19 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 61 (1983); Note,
Housing DiscriminationAgainst Families with Children:A National Concern, 20
WASHRRN L.J. 307 (1981); Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent-An Examination of
Laws ProhibitingDiscrimination Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 1829 (1981); Dunaway and Blied, Discrimination Against Children in
Housing, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 21 (1979); Travalio, Suffer the Little Chil-
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have responded with legislation prohibiting various "all-adult"
housing policies and practices. 2 Although the Fair Housing Act'
dren-But Not in My Neighborhood: A Constitutional View of Age Restrictive
Housing, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 295 (1979); Note, Housing DiscriminationAgainst Children: The Legal Status of A Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559 (1978).
The importance of housing has long been recognized. See, e.g., Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921), where Justice Holmes noted that "[h]ousing is a
necessary of life." "There cannot be the slightest doubt that shelter, along with
food, are the most basic human needs ....
It is plain beyond dispute the proper
provision for adequate housing for all categories of people is certainly an absolute
essential in promotion of the general welfare. . . ." Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 178-79, 336 A.2d 713, 727, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975). See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92
N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1984).
2. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.210 (1981); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317
(Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2231
(1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 3-104 (1980-81); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §
4(11) (Supp. 1981), MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2101-.2806 (Supp. 1980-81);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, Subd. 2(I) (West supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. § 354-A:
8(v)(b) (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17092 (West 1971); N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAw §§ 236-37 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). Many cities have enacted legislation
prohibiting various forms of all-adult housing practices. See Note, Why Johnny
Can't Rent, supra note 1, at 1829 n.4; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Fair Housing
Amendments of 1979, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 200-02 (1979)(describing the extent of all-adult housing problem and prohibiting state legislation).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1982); e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d
1055 (4th Cir. 1982). The Fair Housing Act is a "broad legislative plan to eliminate all traces of discrimination within the housing field." Mar v. Rife, 503 F.2d
735, 740 (6th Cir. 1974). In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
209-12 (1972), the Court noted that the Fair Housing Act is "broad and inclusive"
and must be given "a generous construction." Id. at 211. Congress declared Fair
Housing to be a national policy which it considered "to be of the highest priority." Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982). In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
413-17 (1968), the Court noted that the Fair Housing Act is a "comprehensive
open housing law" that is "applicable to a broad range of discriminatory
practices."
The Fair Housing Act seeks to produce "truly integrated and balanced living
patterns." 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968)(Statement of Senator Walter Mondale).
See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Mayers v.
Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(en banc.). "[Tihe purpose of the [Fair Housing] Act is to promote integrated housing rather than simply outlaw invidious
discrimination." In re Malone, 592 F. Supp 1135, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1984), citing R.
SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 42-43, 127 (1983). "Congress was aware
that the measure [Fair Housing Act] would have a very broad reach, and indeed
the legislation was seen as an attempt to alter the whole character of the housing
market." Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(en banc) (Wilkey,
J., concurring). See generally, Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and
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prohibits discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it does not expressly forbid discrimination on the basis of age or family makeup. However, all-adult housing policies
have broad implications which may, under some circumstances, violate the Fair Housing Act. 4 A case-by-case analysis is necessary in
order to determine if a particular all-adult policy may violate the
Fair Housing Act."
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. (1970); McGuinness, Fundamental Issues In Housing DiscriminationLitigation, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 555 (1984)(discussing procedure,
standing, and standard of proof problems in housing discrimination litigation).
See infra note 64.
4. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Halet v.
Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982). See Note, FamilialDiscrimination,
supra note 1, at 1085-88; Morales, Use Of The Fair Housing Act To Redress
Housing Discrimination Against Families With Children, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 736 (1982); Gelber, Canan, & Hopp, Recent Developments In Housing Discrimination Law, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 806, 809 (1983); R. SCHWEMM, supra
note 3, at 379 (1983). "A no-child rule has often been employed as a ruse to carry
out a policy of racial exclusion." J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN
REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITILIZATION § 2.07 at 29 (1983).

Cf. People v. McKale, 25 Cal. 3d 626, 602 P.2d 731, 159 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1979) (alladult housing policy a ruse to carry out religious discrimination). See Annot., 30
A.L.R. 4th 1187, (collects and discusses state and federal cases addressing
whether a landlord's refusal to rent to families with children is unlawful under
either constitutional or statutory provisions).
It is well established that discrimination is pervasive throughout American
housing markets. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERiCAN LAW § 8.1 (1980); R.
MONTGOMERY & D. MANDELKER, HOUSING IN AMEmck PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIvES 355 (2d ed. 1979); Report, United States Commission On Civil Rights:
Twenty Years After Brown 99 (1975); Report, National Advisory Commission On
Civil Disorders203-04 (1968); Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historicaland
Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United
States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979). In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 575, 594 (1983), the Court recognized that racial discrimination is contrary to
our "fundamental public policy."
5. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (Arlington
II)(indicating that courts must use their discretion on a case-by-case basis in determining whether the discriminatory effects of a particular case may constitute a
violation of the Fair Housing Act). In Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d
126, 149 (3d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978), the Third Circuit noted
that the Title VIII standard of proof criteria must emerge on a case-by-case basis.
See generally, McGuinness, supra note 3, at 584-86; Hsia, The Effects Test: New
Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 777, 795-803 (1977). In Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Arlington I), the Supreme
Court dealt with the issue of whether alleged exclusionary zoning practices violated the Fourteenth Amendment. On remand, the Seventh Circuit considered the
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In Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates,6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that a prima
facie case under the Fair Housing Act may be established where an
all-adult housing policy has a disparate adverse impact upon minorities. Betsey recognized that minorities need only show that a
housing policy or practice has a discriminatory impact on them as
individuals.Betsey noted that an "immediate and substantial impact is sufficient," and rejected the asserted defense that the "bottom line" of the all-adult policy was nondiscriminatory in that it
resulted in some sort of an acceptable racial balance in the apart7
ment complex or community.
Betsey is the first circuit court case to directly apply the Title
VII S prima facie case doctrine using disparate impact analysis in
the case of a private non-governmental defendant charged with
housing discrimination. Betsey is particularly noteworthy because
it clarifies the standard of proof to be applied in housing discrimination cases involving private defendants. Betsey is the first circuit
extent that the plaintiffs' allegations showed a violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Arlington 11, 558 F.2d 1283.
6. 736 F.2d 983, 986-88 (4th Cir. 1984).
7. Id. at 988. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452-56 (1982); Howard v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1984); Schwartz and
Sklover, Connecticut v. Teal: The Final Word On The "Bottom Line" Problem,
14 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 49 (1982). See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
8. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1982) (Equal Employment Opportunity). The Fair Housing Act and Title VII
have parallel anti-discrimination objectives. E.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682
F.2d at 1065; Arlington 11, 558 F.2d at 1290; United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). "Just as
Congress requires ... the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification . . . such barriers must also
give way in the field of housing." Id. at 1184. See Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 199, 212-23 (1978); Comment, Applying The Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11
HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128 (1976); Note, Discriminationin Employment and in
Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 & 1968,
82 HARV. L. REV. 834 (1969). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1977), (citing United States v. West Peachtree
Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971), a fair housing case, thus implying
that the Title VII and Title VIII standards are similar). Cf. Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3243 n.11 (1983)
(Marshall J., dissenting)(citing Arlington II for the proposition that discriminatory motive is difficult to establish).
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court case to expressly find a prima facie case of racially disparate
impact as a result of an all-adult housing policy. Landlords and
policymakers must carefully consider the far-reaching implications
of Betsey when formulating or administering housing policy.
This article will focus on Betsey and its implications. It discusses standard of proof problems and sets forth alternative methods of establishing a prima facie case of housing discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act.
II.

FACTS OF

Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates

The defendants in Betsey owned and managed The Point, a
three-building apartment complex in Silver Spring, Maryland, containing 1,119 housing units. In May 1980, the defendants (landlord) issued eviction notices to families with children under age
twenty-one residing in Building Three, allegedly to implement an
all-adult rental policy. The plaintiffs were tenants of Building
Three, most of whom were black and had children. Blacks then
occupied 31.5 percent of the units in Building Three. However,
62.9 percent of the black tenants received eviction notices, as opposed to only 14.1 percent of the white tenants. In terms of the
total number of individuals residing in Building Three, 74.9 percent of the blacks and 26.4 percent of the whites were evicted.9
9. These figures are statistically significant, and meet the standards-employed by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977) and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). See Chisholm v.
United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 494 n.17 (4th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. American National Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1192-93 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
923 (1982).
Application of a standard test of statistical significance to the Betsey data
indicates that the landlord's conduct (which affected 54.3 percent of all blackoccupied units and 14.1 percent of all white-occupied units) had a differential
effect in the range of 7.5 standard deviations. Of the total number of people affected (74.8 percent of all blacks and 26.7 percent of all whites), the all-adult
policy had a differential effect of approximately 15 standards deviations. These
figures greatly exceed the number of standard deviations held to be statistically
significant in establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact. As the Fourth
Circuit noted in EEOC v. American National Bank, "[sitandard deviations of
more than three . . . confirm the legitimacy of an inference of discrimination
based upon judicial approval that [such] disparities are, to the legally trained eye,
'gross'." 652 F.2d at 1192. See generally, Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. REv. 59 (1974). It is well established that
statistical proof alone may establish a prima facie case of discrimination, even
without evidence of specific instances of discrimination. See infra note 53; Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37
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The plaintiffs (tenants) filed suit under the Fair Housing Act,
alleging that the landlord's use of the all-adult policy was premised
upon racially discriminatory intent, and that the evictions would
have a racially disparate impact. The complaint alleged a pattern
of harassment by the landlord against black residents of The Point
and a "deliberate and systematic effort to alter the racial character" of the property.
A.

District Court Disposition

The tenants moved for a preliminary injunction, and the district court consolidated the hearing with a trial on the merits. The
court recognized that under the Fair Housing Act, plaintiffs may
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing either that the practice complained of was racially motivated or that
it would have a racially discriminatory impact.
The court concluded that the tenants had established a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent, but that the landlord refuted
the tenant's prima facie case by articulating a valid non-discriminatory reason for the all-adult policy. The court employed the Title VII prima facie case doctrine in assessing the discriminatory
intent issue. The court identified several "economic considerations" as valid non-discriminatory reasons for the all-adult policy.
Among those reasons were: 1) a desire to decrease the vacancy rate
in Building Three, 2) that all-adult buildings are quieter, and
therefore more desirable, 3) that maintenance costs would be lower
because of less vandalism due to the lack of children, and 4) an
expressed desire by prospective tenants for an all-adult building.
The court concluded that the landlord's asserted economic considerations were sufficient to rebut the tenant's prima facie case
under the intent standard. Consequently, the court held that no
violation was established under the discriminatory intent
standard.10
(1962) ("statistics... tell much and courts listen"). An inference of disriminatory
intent may be drawn from statistical evidence. E.g., American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401,
1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
10. A violation of the Fair Housing Act may be established under an intent
standard, and, under some circumstances, proof of discriminatory effect alone
may be sufficient. E.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055; United States
v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd as modified, 661 F.2d
562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); McGuinness, supra note 3,
at 580-86. See Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimina-
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In its original opinion, the court indicated that it was unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the tenants had established a
prima facie case under the disparate impact standard, but nevertheless expressed the opinion that it did not think the plaintiffs
could have done so. However, in a later opinion, 1 the district court
found that the evidence failed to make out a prima facie case of
disparate impact. Consequently, the court did not address the is2
sue of whether or not the landlord had a valid business necessity
tion, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). Under the intent standard, a plaintiff need
only establish that a protected classification was one of the motivating factors
involved. E.g., Wood-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1202 (5th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979); McGuinness, supra note 3, at
580-82.
Under the intent standard in an individual case, as opposed to a class-type
case, courts have often analogized to Title VII and applied a disparate treatment
theory. E.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.
1982); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976). A prima facie
case of disparate treatment may be established by proving that the plaintiff: 1)
belongs to a minority group, 2) that he applied for and was qualified to rent or
purchase the housing, 3) that he was rejected despite his qualifications and, 4)
that the housing remained available. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d at
1038; Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980)
(construing 42 U.S.C. § 1982); McHaney v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566, 570 (W.D.
Tenn. 1981). See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). "[T]he McDonnell Douglas Formula does not require direct proof of discrimination." Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). Cf. Arlington I,
429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977) (Court identified factors to be considered to determine whether or not discriminatory intent or purpose is present). See Broderick,
The Nature of The Constitutional Process: Equal Protection And The Burger
Court, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 320, 323 (1981).
However, the prima facie case method established in McDonnell Douglas was
"never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it
bears on the critical question of discrimination." United States Postal Serv. v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983), quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
11. No. R-80-1907, slip op. at 2 (D. Md. November 27, 1981). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that a prima facie case of employment discrimination
under Title VII may be established by practices which are facially neutral, but
discriminatory in effect. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 349;
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-25 (1975); McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802 n.14; Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices which are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Id.).
12. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). In Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 1974), the Eighth Circuit recognized that a
business necessity defense might be invoked in a housing discrimination case
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to support the all-adult policy. In holding that the plaintiffs failed
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the court reasoned that:
The statistics in this case do show that the immediate effect of
the conversion will have a disproportionate impact on the black
tenants. However, there is no evidence that the conversion will
have a continuing disproportionate impact on blacks. In fact, the
percentage of blacks at The Point continues to exceed by a substantial margin both the percentage of black renters in the election district in which The Point is located as well as in Montgomery County as a whole. Absent statistics which indicate that the
conversion of Building Three would perpetuate or tend to cause
segregated housing patterns at The Point, the court would be reluctant to find that plaintiffs had made a prima facie case of discriminatory impact. There is no evidence that the conversion of
Building Three will have a greater impact on blacks in the local
community nor is there evidence that the conversion will perpetuate segregation at The Point.'3
Thus, the court's finding that the tenants failed to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact was premised on three primary bases: 1) the absence of a continuing disparate impact on
blacks, 2) The Point, as a whole, had a higher percentage of blacks
under appropriate circumstances. The court explained the business necessity defense: "In order to rely upon a 'business necessity' justification for a business policy which, though fair in form, is discriminatory in operation a defendant must
demonstrate the absence of any acceptable alternative that will accomplish the
same business goal with less discrimination." Id. See Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-ImpactLiability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHL L. REV.
911 (1979); Note, Business Necessity Defense Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: A No Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
While the circuit courts are in accord that a significant discriminatory effect
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act, there is no
uniformity as to which of the various effects tests to apply. Also, there is no uniformity concerning the standard of justification which the defendant must meet
where the prima facie case doctrine is employed. McGuinness, supra note 3, at
584. In Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977), the
Third Circuit stated that the defendant may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case
by showing that the defendant's conduct serves "in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title VIII defendant, and that the defendant must
show that no alternative course of action could be adopted that would enable that
interest to be served with less discriminatory impact." Id. Cf. Williams v. Matthew, 499 F.2d 819, 827 (8th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231
(8th Cir. 1976).
13. No. R-80-1907, slip. op. at 12 (D. Md. April 23, 1981).
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than in the local community, and 3) the impact on blacks in the
local community would be insignificant, and that the conversion of
Building Three to all-adult would not perpetuate segregation at
The Point.
B.

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Disposition

On appeal, the tenants argued that: 1) the district court had
erroneously applied the disparate impact test, 2) the disparate impact of the all-adult policy was substantial enough to establish a
prima facie case, and 3) the landlord failed to rebut the evidence of
disparate impact because it failed to prove that the all-adult policy
was based on a valid business necessity.
Betsey presented a case of first impression concerning what
standard of proof would apply in the case of a private non-governmental defendant in a housing discrimination case premised upon
a disparate impact theory. In Smith v. Town of Clarkton,14 the
Fourth Circuit recently adopted a four-prong disparate impact test
in a housing discrimination case where the Town of Clarkton,
North Carolina, blocked the construction of a low income housing
project. The four critical factors, as identified by the court in
Clarkton, are:
1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; 2)
is there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not
enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v.
Davis; 3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action
complained of; and 4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members-of minority
groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with
individual property owners who wish to provide such housing.15
However, in Betsey, the Fourth Circuit held that the Clarkton
four-prong analysis should only be applied where a public body is
the defendant. 6 Instead, the court adopted the prima facie case
14. 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); McGuinness, supra note 3, at 584-85;
Ryan, Standards of Proof in Title VIII Cases, 40 WASH. LEE. L. REv. 613, 623
(1983). See Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 865-67 (E.D. Va. 1982).
15. Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1065; Arlington II, 558 F.2d at 1290. See McGuinness, supra note 3, at 582-86.
16. 736 F.2d at 988 n.5. The Clarkton analysis applies to a wide range of
practices by governmental bodies which have discriminatory effects. See Arlington II, 558 F.2d at 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (exclusionary land use practices). Cf. Resident Advisory Rd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
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doctrine developed from Title VII where the defendant is a private
17
entity.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and its progeny have established a
three-part analysis to be applied to disparate impact claims. First,
a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by proving that the
facially neutral practice had a significant discriminatory impact.
Second, the employer may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by
showing that the practice has a "manifest relationship to the employment in question." Griggs went on to note that "[tjhe touchstone is business necessity." 18 Third, even where the employer has
proved that the practice in question was due to business necessity,
the plaintiff may prevail if he can show that the employer was using the practice as a pretext for discrimination.1 9
Betsey concisely identified the analysis to be applied in a
housing discrimination case against a private entity:
[tihe inquiry is whether either discriminatory intent or impact
can be proved and, if either or both is proved, whether there is a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason sufficient to overcome the
showing of intent, or whether a compelling business necessity exists, sufficient to overcome the showing of disparate impact."0
Unfortunately, the court blended together the analysis for both the
intent and impact theories. However, the court's analysis is sufficiently clear so that it is not confusing.
(1978) (rejection of public housing); United States v. Chicksaw Hous. Auth., 504
F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (citizenship requirement).
17. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist.
No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981);
Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979)
(en banc). In Arlington II, 558 F.2d at 1293, the Seventh Circuit recognized that
courts should use greater scrutiny in reviewing private housing practices which
have racially discriminatory effects. "If the defendant is a private individual...
seeking to protect private rights, the courts cannot be overly solicitous when the
effect is to perpetuate segregated housing." Id., citing Smith v. Anchor Bldg.
Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976).
18. 401 U.S. at 431. See Connecticut v. Teal, 447 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982);
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. Lorillard, 444
F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
19. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
20. 736 F.2d at 988 n.5.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/3
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1. Business Necessity
The Fourth Circuit also discussed the business necessity defense. The court stated that: "when confronted with a showing of
discriminatory impact, defendants must prove a business necessity
sufficiently compelling to justify the challenged practice."' 21 In
adopting the business necessity test, the Betsey court relied upon
2 2 which is
Robinson v. Lorillard,
perhaps the leading case setting
forth the standards by which business necessity is measured. In
Robinson, the Fourth Circuit identified the business necessity defense as follows:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must
be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it
is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a
23
lesser differential racial impact.

Betsey failed to make clear whether and to what extent each
of the components of the Robinson business necessity test are applicable in a housing discrimination case. Betsey held that "when
confronted with a showing of discriminatory impact, defendants
must prove a business necessity sufficiently compelling to justify
the challenged practice."2' 4 Yet, the Robinson test includes additional factors which would be more difficult for the defendant to
prove. 2' However, since the district court did n't find a prima facie
21. Id. at 988.
22. 444 F.2d 791 (4th cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See Burwell
v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 369 n.11 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
965 (1981); Pennington v. Lexington School Dist. 2, 578 F.2d 546, 549 (4th Cir.
1978).
23. 444 F.2d at 798 (footnotes omitted). In Blake v. Los Angeles, 595 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980), the Ninth Circuit noted
that "the 'business necessity' defense is very narrow ....

"

Id. at 1377.

24. 736 F.2d at 988.
25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The additional Robinson factors requiring the defendant to prove that the challenged practice must carry out
the alleged business purpose, and the no less drastic means requirement would
obviously make the defendant's policy or practice more difficult to justify. In
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 n.14 (1977), the Court noted that "a
discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1985
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case of disparate impact, it did not reach the issue of whether or
not the landlord proved that the all-adult policy was premised
upon a business necessity. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case
to the district court for a determination of the business necessity
issue without expressing any view as to whether the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the business necessity defense.
Although the court in Betsey did not address the issue, it is
worth noting that mere opinion testimony of an interested party
regarding the need for a particular policy is generally insufficient
to meet the defendant's burden of proving a business necessity.2"
The business necessity defense must be established "by independent, objective evidence." A subjective belief that the policy is necessary and effective is not sufficient. 7 The business necessity defense "succeeds or fails on objective necessity based on facts
available to it at the time it designed the controverted policy."2 "
Therefore, in order for a landlord to successfully rebut a prima facie case by proving that the challenged policy was premised upon
business necessity, the landlord must affirmatively prove the business necessity with independent objective evidence. Even assuming
that defendants could produce independent evidence demonstrating that a substantial portion of their prospective tenants had a
strong desire for all-adult housing, tenant preference alone would
be insufficient to justify a policy which has a racially discriminatory effect. 9
One of the reasons asserted by the landlords in Betsey for the
all-adult policy was that the maintenance costs would be lower in
the absence of children. However, the landlord failed to introduce
efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge." Thus, the Supreme
Court has recognized at least part of the Robinson business necessity test.
26. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at
431-35; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 422 U.S. at 329; Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d at
1190; Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798.
27. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d at 1190. Cf. Williams v. Matthew, 499 F.2d
at 828.
28. Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d at 373.
29. United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 650 (N.D. Cal.
1973), affd in relevant part, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975). In Youritan, the court
held that "prospective compatibility with other tenants is not an appropriate
rental consideration when its application would have a discriminatory racial impact." Cf. Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ("Objective
criteria cannot have the effect of excluding blacks from housing unless the criteria
are demonstrably a reasonable measure of the aplicant's ability to be a successful
tenant"); United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/3
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any significant independent evidence that maintenance costs would
be diminished by implementing an all-adult policy. Rather, the
available research suggests that renting to families with children
does not necessarily increase maintenance costs. After an exhaustive search, one study concluded that "there is no empirical data
which compares maintenance costs in buildings which do and do
not allow children."' ' 0 However, the study did find that "the insurance industry, with its enormous amounts of data on claims, does
not consider the presence of children a significant factor in setting
rates for apartment buildings." 31 In another study, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development found that "there are no empirical studies comparing maintenance costs in buildings which do
and do not rent to children. Nor is there any evidence supporting
manager's reports of higher costs for rental units leased by families
with children."3 2 In Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson,33 the California
Supreme Court recognized expert testimony that the basic profitability of operating an apartment complex does not generally vary
with the type or age of its tenants. Thus, it appears that landlords
will be unable to prove business necessity by introducing unsupported conclusory testimony that the presence of children would
necessarily increase maintenance costs.
Even if a landlord could prove that the presence of children
would increase maintenance costs, increased costs alone will not
necessarily justify policies that have a racially disparate impact. As
the Fourth Circuit noted in Robinson v. Lorillard:"while considerations of economy and efficiency will often be relevant to determine the existence of business necessity, dollar cost alone is not
determinative."'" "[Alvoidance of the expense of changing employ30. D. ASHFORD AND P. EASTON, THE ExTENT AND EFFECTs OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST CHILDREN IN RENTAL HOUSING: A STUDY OF FIVE CALIFORNIA CITIES 36
(1979). See Morales, supra note 4, at 741-42.
31. D. ASHFORD AND P. EASTON, supra note 30, at 37.
32. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Our Families
5-16 (1980); citing R. MARANS, M. COLTEN, R. GROVES AND B. THOMAS, MEASURING
RESTRICTIVE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECTING FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN: A NATIONAL

SURVEY 64 (1980). However, the HUD survey found that 81 percent of the landlords surveyed believed that maintenance costs of renting to families with children were either a "big problem" or "somewhat a problem." Id.
33. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982). In Marina Point,
the court also considered and rejected testimony from two real estate agents who
testified that maintenance costs of buildings which allow children were higher
than for those which prohibited children.
34. 444 F.2d at 799 n.2.
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ment practices is not a business purpose that will validate the racially differential effects of an otherwise unlawful employment
practice." 5 The issue is whether or not increased maintenance
costs due to the presence of children, if affirmatively proven by the
landlord, is sufficiently compelling to override the racially disparate impact of the all-adult policy. This determination may turn on
the degree of disparate impact. A policy which is marginally discriminatory might be justifiable, while a substantially disparate
impact will likely be difficult to overcome.
Another reason asserted by the landlord in Betsey to support
the all-adult policy was the perceived demand for all-adult housing. While few studies exist concerning tenant preferences with respect to the presence of children, one study conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan found that
"only 20 percent [of tenants residing in all-adult buildings] said
they chose their building because no children were living there."
The study concluded that "the majority of renters in the sample
would take no action if the policies or practices concerning children in their buildings were changed."' 6 Moreover, in United
States v. Youritan Construction Co.,3 7 the court noted that "prospective compatibility with other tenants is not an appropriate
rental consideration when its application would have a discriminatory racial impact." Therefore, a landlord's use of tenant preference to justify an all-adult policy is questionable in any case where
that policy results in a disparate impact. Where a landlord attempts to use tenant preference to justify an all-adult policy, the
landlord must be prepared to affirmatively prove that such a preference exists with independent objective evidence.3"
2. DisparateImpact Analysis Applied To Affected Tenants
Another noteworthy consideration in Betsey concerned the application of the disparate impact test to the current residents of
Building Three, as opposed to prospective tenants and residents of
35. Id. at 800. "Administrative convenience is not a sufficient justification for
[discriminatory] practices." Blake v. Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1375-76 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980).
36. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Our Families,
5-9, 10 (1980).
37. 370 F. Supp. 643, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in relevant part, 509 F.2d
623 (9th Cir. 1975).
38. See supra notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text.
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the entire apartment complex. Generally, a policy or practice has a
racially disparate impact if it disadvantages a significantly greater
proportion of one racial group than another. 9
In Betsey, the district court found that "there is no evidence
that the conversion [to all-adult housing in Building Three] will
have a continuing disproportionate impact upon blacks," since
"there was no showing that in the pool of prospective renters...
the percentage of blacks with families compared to the total numbers of blacks . . . was disproportionately higher than the same
figures for whites."' 0 The landlord argued that the relevant group
on which to assess the impact of the conversion to all-adult was
The Point as a whole, rather than the tenants of Building Three.
The landlord asserted that there was no community-wide or project-wide discriminatory impact, thus, the "bottom-line" of the
rental policy was not discriminatory. However, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that "plaintiffs are not required to show a discriminatory impact on anyone but the existing minority residents of
Building Three. This simple verity renders consideration of the
rest of the 'local community,' the rest of The Point, or even prospective applicants for space in Building Three irrelevant." 1 Consequently, given the significant disparate impact of the all-adult
policy on the tenants of Building Three, a prima facie case under
the Fair Housing Act was established.
The district court erred when it looked beyond the impact
that the all-adult policy had on the current residents of Building
39. E.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1061, 1064, 1065; Arlington
11, 558 F.2d at 1290; United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. at 867-68. Cf. Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures-1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1607, which adopted the eighty percent or
four-fifths rule for determining what degree of impact is adverse. A selection procedure that selects minorities at eighty percent or more of that rate at which majorities are selected does not have an adverse impact. See Clady v. Los Angeles,
770 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985); Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept in
Equal Opportunity Law, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 2, 17 (1980).
Courts have recognized that a facially neutral housing practice may have a
discriminatory effect in a second sense by perpetuating existing patterns of residential segregation and interferring with interracial associations. Betsey, 736 F.2d
at 987 n.3; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Arlington 11, 558 F.2d at 1290; United States v. City
of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Malone, 592 F. Supp.
1135, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Hous. Auth. of Chicksaw, 504 F.
Supp. 716, 730-31 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
40. No. R-80-1907, slip op. at 12 &.n.12 (D. Md. April 23, 1981).
41. 736 F.2d at 987.
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Three. it erroneously focused on the impact of the all-adult policy
on the pool of prospective tenants. The plaintiffs only challenged
the landlord's decision to evict the tenants with children residing
in Building Three. The plaintiffs did not allege any continuing discriminatory impact on blacks which might seek to live at The
Point in the future, even though an all-adult policy may cause such
a continuing discriminatory impact.
Where a policy or practice is challenged because of its adverse
impact upon current residents, courts look to the existing tenants,
not the population at large, as the appropriate pool by which to
measure the impact of the challenged policy or practice.42 Where a
policy or practice is challenged because it interferes with the initial availability of housing opportunities, courts examine the impact of the policy or practice on the prospective applicants.43 This
approach is similar to that followed
in employment discrimination
44
cases brought under Title VII.

3. Rejection of The Bottom-Line Defense
In Betsey, the landlord asserted that the "bottom-line" of the
all-adult policy was not discriminatory because it continued to rent
to a significant proportion of black applicants, and The Point continued to house a significant number of blacks. However, the
42. See United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978); Concerned
Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1980). In
United States v. Mitchell, the Fifth Circuit held that the clustering of black tenants in one section of a multi-building apartment complex is one kind of "significant discriminatory effect" that is "sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the
Fair Housing Act." 580 F.2d at 791.
43. In Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1055, 1061-65, the Fourth Circuit examined the discriminatory impact of the terminination of the proposed
public housing project on the black population of Bladen County. Sixty-nine percent of all black families in Bladen County were presumptively eligible for low
income housing, while only twenty-six percent of the white population was qualified. Id. at 1061. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 142.
44. Where plaintiffs challenge a hiring practice on the grounds that it has
discriminatory impact, courts examine the effect of the practice on the pool of
potential employees as reflected by the relevant application pool or the appropriate labor market. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Where plaintiffs challenge a practice that affects the existing work force, such as
policies relating to promotions, working conditions or terminations, courts focus
on the current pool of employees, rather than applciants or potential employees.
See Connecticut v. Teal. 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Wright v. Olin, 697 F.2d 1172 (4th
Cir. 1982).
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Fourth Circuit squarely rejected the bottom-line defense, relying
upon Connecticut v. Teal.45
In Teal, the Supreme Court noted that the principal focus of
Title VII is the protection of the individual employee, rather than
the protection of the minority group as a whole.4 Applying this
reasoning in Betsey, the Fourth Circuit implicitly concluded that
the individual tenants of Building Three derived similar protection
from the Fair Housing Act. 47 "'Bottom line' considerations of the
number and percentage of minorities in the rest of the complex or
community are 'of little comfort' to those minority families evicted
from Building Three. ' ' 48 Consequently, the fact that an apartment
complex may be integrated to some extent or that other blacks
may be able to rent units at the complex is not a legitimate defense. The fact that other blacks may move into the complex does
not diminish the discriminatory impact of evictions on blacks families faced with displacement. Thus, regardless of the bottom-line
of a housing policy, a discriminatory impact upon residents of a
particular building is sufficient to establish a prima facie case
under the Fair Housing Act.
4. DiscriminatoryImpact of All-Adult Housing Policies
Looking beyond the particular case of Betsey, the discriminatory impact of all-adult housing policies is national in scope, as
evidenced in several comprehensive studies. A study commissioned
45. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See Note, The Bottom Line Concept in Title VII
Litigation: Connecticut v. Teal and the Relevance of End Results, 15 CONN. L.
REV. 821 (1983); Note, The Bottom Line Concept Under Title VII: Connecticut v.
Teal, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1131 (1983); Note, The Bottom Line Defense In Title VII
Actions: Supreme Court's Rejection In Connecticut v. Teal And A Modified Approach, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 735 (1983). See supra note 7.
46. 457 U.S. at 453-54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). Title VII and its
legislative history are replete with references to protection for the individual employee. 457 U.S. at 454. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),(b),(c), 20000e-3(a) (1982).
Cf. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (fairness
to class of women employees as a whole could not justify unfairness to the individual female employee because the statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous). See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) provides that it is unlawful "[t]o discriminate against
any person." (emphasis added).
48. 736 F.2d at 987, quoting Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. at 454-55. In
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579, the Supreme Court noted that
"[a] racially balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from liability for
specific acts of discrimination."
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by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, using interviews of renters with children in nineteen metropolitan areas, found that:
Among the respondents

...

minorities were the most heavily

burdened by serious problems caused by restrictive rental policies. The severity of their burden may be the result of insufficient
income. However, even among those with incomes of $15,000 and
above, a statistically significant difference was found between the
frequency of serious problems experienced by minority complainants. This raises the question as to whether at times no-children
policies are a smoke screen for racial discrimination.49
Another study designed to evaluate the effect of adults-only policies nationwide found that "[m]inority group renters were more
likely to have children in the households. ' 50 Thus, even without
examining the impact of a particular policy, all-adult policies will
generally tend to have a disparate impact upon minorities.
These studies also show that all-adult housing policies have an
adverse effect on minorities in other respects. All-adult housing is
often concentrated in predominantly white areas.5 1 Given the de49. J. GREmE & G.BLAKE, How REsTRIcTIvE RENTAL PRACTICES AFFEcT FAM3-4 (1980).
50. R. MARANS, M. COLTEN, R. GROVES & B. THOMAS, MEASURING RESTRICTIVE

ILES WITH CHILDREN

RENTAL PRACTICES AFFECTING FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN:

A

NATIONAL SURVEY 9-10

(1980). While blacks constituted 18 percent of the renter households in this sur-

vey, they made up 25 percent of all renter households with children. Id. at 13,
Table II-1. In 1980, 55.8 percent of blacks and other minorities were renters, while
only 31.3 percent of whites were renters. U.S. Bureau of The Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1982-83, 757 (1982). Another study found that 24
percent of all white renter households in California have children, while 41 percent of black renter households and 54 percent of hispanic renter households have

children. Such disparities are even greater in areas with a sizeable minority population. D. ASHFORD AND P. EASTON, THE EXTENT AND EFFECT OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST

CHILDREN IN RENTAL

HOUSING:

A

STUDY OF FIVE CALIFORNIA CITIES

(1979). In Los Angeles, 71 percent of advertised apartments did not allow chil-

dren. Id. "The cumulative impact of that [all-adult] policy could be as segregating
as were racial covenants in the first half of the century, a fact that could lead to a

finding of discrimination if presented in the context of the regional impact."
Kushner, supra note 4, at 91.
51. C. REID, A. KEATING AND L. LONG, PATTERNS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CHILDREN IN RENTAL HOUSING IN THE METRo-ATLANTA AREA (1979) (43.7 percent

of all adult rental units located in predominantly white sections of Atlanta, while
only 6.4 percent located in minority areas); J.G. & ASSOCIATES, CHILD DISCRIMINATION IN RENTAL HOUSING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF APARTMENT POLICIES IN
DALLAS, TEXAS REGARDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN (1979) (68
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clining birth rate among whites, and the increasing birth rate
among blacks, and the concentration of all-adult policies in largely
white areas, all-adult policies have the effect of perpetuating ex52
isting patterns of racial segregation.
5. Methods of EstablishingA PrimaFacie Case of Disparate
Impact
A prima facie case of disparate impact as a result of an alladult housing policy may be established in several ways. Through
general population statistics, a plaintiff may demonstrate that minorities, either nationally or in a specific geographical area, have
children at a significantly higher rate than whites.3 This entails a
percent of all adults-only units located in predominantly white areas, while 11
percent located in minority areas); R. MARINS, 1L COLTEN, R GROVES, & B.
THOMAS, supra note 50, at 34-37 (rental units in predominantly white neighborhoods are twice as likely to restrict families with children than rentals units in
predominantly black areas).
52. R. MARINS, M. COLTEN, R. GROVES, & B. THOMAS, supra note 50, at 43, 46;
House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, U.S. Children and Their
Families: Current Conditions and Recent Trends, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (May,
1983). This perpetuation of existing residential segregation is a basis for a finding
of discriminatory effect violative of the Fair Housing Act. See supra note 39;
Comment, Justifying A Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Act: A
Search for the ProperStandard, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 398, 411 (1979). In addition,
widespread use of all-adult policies forces families with children to look longer
and pay more for housing, to accept housing that is less attractive, farther from
work or located in racially concentrated areas, or to endure the frustration of being unable to find decent housing. See, e.g., J. GREEN & G. BLAKE, supra note 49,
at 1-4; D. ASHFORD & P. ESTON, supra note 30, at 11-33. Finally, by limiting the
housing opportunities available to minority families with children, these policies
serve to exacerbate the already dismal conditions in which many minority households are forced to live. As one recent study has found, minority families with
children are "inadequately, housed at nearly twice the rate as the population as a
whole, and at more than twice the rate for whites." See Children's Defense Fund,
Portrait of Inequality: Black and White Children in American 107, Table 52
(1980).
53. See supra notes 50 and 52 and accompanying text; Morales, supra note 4
at 744 & n.11. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971) (An
employer's use of a high school diploma as a condition of employment was discriminatory in operation because census figures of North Carolina showed that
"while 34% of white males had completed high school, only 12% of Negro males
had done so."). Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 324-30 (1977) (National demographic statistics demonstrated the discriminatory effect of a job's height and
weight requirements which would exclude "41.13% of the female population while
excluding less than 1% of the male population"). See SMITH, CRAVER & CLARK,
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comparison of the percentage of minorities in the general population excluded by an all-adult policy with the percentage of whites
in the general population that would be excluded by the policy.
This approach assesses the discrimination against potential
tenants.
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case through a population disparity analysis which compares the proportion of minorities in an all-adult building with their proportion in the relevant
geographical area in order to demonstrate that minorities are significantly underrepresented in the building. This approach was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Teamsters and Hazelwood,
where the Court reasoned that "[aibsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial
and ethnic compositions of the population in the community from
which employees are hired." 55 A population disparity analysis may
be difficult to obtain because many apartment buildings are small,
with few units; therefore, there will be few tenants to compare with
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw

450-53 (2d. ed. 1982).

It is well established that statistical proof alone may establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, even without evidence of specific instances of discrimination. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); Davis v. Califano,
613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 418 F.2d 543, 549
(4th Cir. 1975). Statistical evidence may establish a prima facie case of discrimination in an individual case, as well as a class action. Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d
at 762; Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 577 F.2d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Thus, even a single aggrieved tenant may be able to challenge an all-adult
policy with statistical evidence. See supra note 8.
54. Morales, supra note 4, at 747 & n.12. See United States v. Real Estate
Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Schwemm, supra note 8, at 24346. Cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (Prima facie
case of discrimination can be established by comparing racial composition in the
relevant labor market). In Hazelwood, the Court noted that a definition of the
relevant labor market is a precondition to a comparison of the racial composition
of the defendant's work force with the racial composition of the community. 433
U.S. at 308 n.13. See generally, Shoben, Probing The Discriminatory Effects of
Employee Selection Procedures With Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title
VII, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Employment Discrimination: Plaintiff's
Prima Facie Case and Defendant's Rebuttal in a DisparateImpact Case, 54 TUL.
L. REV. 1187 (1980). In a housing discrimination case applying this analysis, the
determination of the relevant housing market will likely be a hotly contested issue, as it may largely determine the degree of statistical disparity.
55. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307 (1977), quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 399
n.20 (1977).
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the population of the surrounding area.56
A prima facie case may be established through applicantflow
data showing that the defendant's all-adult policy rejects minorities at a significantly higher rate than whites. 5. Applicant flow data
may be difficult to obtain because many landlords do not maintain
records of applicants, and many prospective applicants with children will be deterred from filing applications through pre-screening and other devices.5 8
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case through the perpetuation of segregationtheory where the area is residentially segregated. 59 Finally, under the theory employed in Betsey, a prima
facie case may be established with data demonstrating that the imposition of an all-adult policy results in the eviction, or less
favorable treatment of, a disproportionate number of minorities.6 0
The theory employed in Betsey and the use of general population statistics appear to be the most potent weapons for challenging all-adult policies."' General population statistics are readily
56. Morales, supra note 4, at 738.
57. Morales, supra note 4, at 737-38 & n.13. Cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (Employer's use of standardized test "resulted in 58% of whites passing the tests, as
compared with only 6% of the blacks.").
58. Morales, supra note 4, at 738.
59. See supra note 39; Morales, supra note 4, at 738.
60. Morales, supra note 4, at 738.
61. In addition to attacking all-adult housing policies under the Fair Housing
Act, plaintiffs may proceed under state or municipal legislation prohibiting alladult policies, if available. See supra note 2. Also, where the requisite state action
is present, federal and state constitutional provisions may afford a basis for relief.
See Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975)
(discriminatory practice by a private landlord did not involve state action); Langley v. Monumental Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Md. 1980) (constitutional challenge to all-adult policy dismissed due to absence of state action). Constitutional
challenges to all-adult policies have met with mixed success. Cf. Halet v. Wend
Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1982) (court found that state action
infringed on the plaintiff's fundamental right to live with his family; but the court
remanded for consideration of whether a "generally significant deprivation" had
occurred, and if so, whether the all-adult policy could survive strict scrutiny);
Molina v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. 195, 204, 281 A.2d 405, 412 (L. Div.
1971)(court held that a zoning ordinance which had the effect of excluding children violated the state's equal protection clause); Marina Point v. Wolfson, 30
Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1972) (en banc) (court invalidated
all-adult policy on the basis of an equal protection analysis of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act.). Other courts have rejected Fourteenth Amendment challenges to alladult policies. E.g., White Egret Condominium v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla.
1979); Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. App. 1976).
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available from census and other data. Analysis of such general population data is perhaps an appropriate starting point in developing
a challenge to an all-adult policy. The general data might be sufficient to allege a violation of the Fair Housing Act. Then, through
discovery, a plaintiff may develop additional supporting evidence
through population disparity and applicant flow data. Also, a
showing of discriminatory impact is often an important starting
point in determining whether discriminatory intent or purpose
62
may be present.

III. CONCLUSION
In Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, the Fourth Circuit extended and improved a developing avenue of relief for victims of
housing discrimination. Betsey represents a much needed clarification in the standard of proof principles in housing discrimination
law. Betsey carefully delineated and explained the application of
the prima facie case doctrine to a housing discrimination case premised upon the disparate impact theory. The Fourth Circuit distinguished the Clarkton four-prong analysis, which is applicable to
public entities, from the Title VII prima facie case doctrine, which
is applicable to private defendants. 3
Since housing is not a fundamental right under the federal constitution,
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), and age is not a suspect classification,
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), due process appears to be the stronger basis for a constitutional challenge to all-adult policies.
In Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., the Ninth Circuit noted that "family life, in particular
the right of family members to live together, is part of the fundamental right of
privacy . . . ." 672 F.2d at 1311. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
62. Arlington 1, 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). In Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Pennick, 433 U.S. 499, 465 (1979), the Court noted that actions having foreseeable
and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence of discriminatory purpose.
See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049,
1054 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in relevant part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982), McGuinness, supra note 3, at 579. "[A]n invidious
discriminatory intent may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886). Cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), where a divided
Court declined to find an inference of discriminatory purpose in a voting rights
case.
63. 736 F.2d 988 n.5. Much confusion exists among the circuit courts concerning the various discriminatory effects tests. McGuinness, supra note 3, at 58486. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
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The application of the prima facie case doctrine to all-adult
housing policies is a fair mechanism to assess the consequences of
a particular all-adult policy." 4 Employing the test enunciated in
Betsey, plaintiffs will likely find it somewhat easier to establish a
prima facie case. However, landlords are then afforded a fair opportunity to rebut the prima facie case by proving "a business necessity sufficiently compelling to justify the challenged practice." 65
While Halet v. Wend Investment Co.6 6 recognized that
"[s]ignificant discriminatory effects flowing from rental decisions
[all-adult housing policies] may be sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Fair Housing Act," Betsey removed the uncertainty in
developing a challenge to such policies by setting forth the precise
analysis to be applied in determining whether a violation has been
established. Betsey is a valuable tool in the arsenal of fair housing
litigants, and represents a major step toward fulfilling the national
policy of fair housing.

435 U.S. 908 (1978), where the court purported to set forth a prima facie case test,
but also mentioned, without explanation, that the Arlington II factors may be
relevant. Id. at 149 n.36. In United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.
1978), the Fifth Circuit adopted the Arlington II language concerning perpetuation of segregation as a discriminatory effect, but Mitchell failed to apply the
Arlington II four-prong test. However, Betsey has laid much of this confusion to
rest, at least in the Fourth Circuit.
64. The Fair Housing Act was designed to prohibit "all forms of discrimination, sophisticated as well as simple minded." Williams v. Matthews, 499 F.2d
819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974). See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)(voting
rights). "Effect and not motivation is the touchstone because a thoughtless housing practice can be as unfair to minority rights as a willful scheme." Smith v.
Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976). The legislative history of
the Fair Housing Act indicates that Congress sought to eliminate the adverse discriminatory effects of past and present discrimination in housing. 114 CONG. REc.
2280 (1968) (Remarks of Senator Brooke). See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,
564 F.2d 126, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'g 425 F. Supp. 987, 1022-23 (E.D. Pa.
1976). See supra note 3.
65. 736 F.2d at 988. See Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
66. 672 F.2d at 1311.
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